



“Atmosphere” refers to a feeling, mood, or Stimmung that fundamentally 
exceeds an individual body and instead pertains primarily to the overall situ-
ation in which bodies are entrenched. The concept of an atmosphere thus 
challenges a notion of feelings as the private mental states of a cognizant 
subject and instead construes feelings as collectively embodied, spatially 
extended, material, and culturally inflected. In this sense “atmosphere” can be 
considered a mereological concept: While “affect” refers to the ways in which 
(emerging) bodies relate to each other (→ affect), “atmosphere” describes the 
ways in which a multiplicity of bodies is part of, and entrenched in, a situ-
ation that encompasses it. In this respect, atmospheres tend to be contagious, 
as they wield authority over the entirety of bodies in a situation. Timothy 
Morton (2007) conceives of the homogenization characteristic of atmospheres 
as “rendering”: a mass of elements is rendered in one all- encompassing 
rhythm or hue. Atmospheres are thus modes in which the world shows up or 
coalesces into an indivisible and intensive situation or in which a group of 
bodies comes to exist as a felt collective. In this regard, atmosphere operates 
as a medium that brings into appearance that which cannot be deduced from 
or reduced to the bodies present in a situation. Nor can an atmosphere be 
referred to as a single, specific source. An atmosphere, then, not only simu-
lates a palpable unity where there might otherwise be difference, but can even 
render potential futures or repressed memories abundantly present, or make 
otherwise absent or ulterior persons or relationships perceptible. Crucially, 
these effects of atmosphere are not mental projections “into the world” but 
have a material presence and pertain to embodied processes of involvement.
 German philosopher Hermann Schmitz (1969/2005), who introduced the 
term atmosphere into phenomenology in the 1960s, considered atmospheres 
as meaningful situations and as spatially extended non- subjective feelings. 
Drawing on Schmitz, yet largely dissenting from his so- called new phenomeno-
logy, the term “atmosphere” has been variously defined across disciplinary 
boundaries in recent scholarship. For instance, atmospheres have been charac-
terized as qualities of a space (Böhme, 2017), as mediums of perception 
(Thibaud, 2003), or as a non- representational social dimension (McCormack, 
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2008; Anderson, 2009). Despite philosophical and disciplinary heterogeneity, 
these various notions of atmosphere all grapple with, and aim at subverting, 
binary distinctions between inner and outer world, medium and content, 
meaning and matter, individual and collective, body and mind, subject and 
object. Atmosphere is invoked as that which mediates between two terms, 
integrates both, or precedes their distinction.
 To study the ways in which atmosphere pertains to affective societies, I 
suggest a move beyond traditional phenomenology of perception or aes-
thetic theory. These approaches consider the subject as a perceiver of atmo-
spheres, and accordingly construe the latter as aesthetic or perceptual 
givens. My interest, by contrast, is focused on what an atmosphere does and 
how it operates. Thus, this chapter foregrounds the mereological structure 
of atmosphere, as well as its capacity to modulate situations and collectives 
into coherent wholes. While the manipulation and creation of atmosphere 
is critical in the arts and architecture, which share a traditional under-
standing of and concern with human perception, I will outline a concept of 
atmosphere by means of examples from domains that do not center on the 
perception of individual subjects. Instead, I propose to conceive of atmo-
sphere in relation to (religious) transformation, (mass) mobilization, and 
processes of (political) homogenization. Furthermore, due to the close 
affinity that music and sound have with atmosphere, I approximate atmo-
sphere through music. In what follows, I trace the genealogy of the term 
atmosphere in German, and point to its grammatical specifics, before elabo-
rating on four of its key characteristics.
A genealogy of atmosphere
The modern Latin term “atmosphaera” that entered English, German, or French 
derives from the Ancient Greek “ατμόσφαιρα,” a sphere of vapor, steam, or 
emanation. It is widely assumed in scholarship on atmosphere that the notion of 
atmosphere as feeling is a metaphorical adaption of a meteor ological term. 
However, closer attention to the term’s genealogy in German in important but 
so far largely neglected historical texts not only challenges this interpretation, 
but also significantly broadens the semantic scope of the term.
 From the early 18th century onward, “atmosphere,” particularly in German 
and French, did not simply denote the aerial vapors of celestial bodies but 
referred to corporeal effluvia, substances that emanated from and enveloped 
humans and all other sentient and non- sentient bodies, and also referred to the 
force field of magnets. These “atmospheres” primarily related to the sense of 
smell and were composed of various transpirations specific to a body, but also 
comprised humors and passions, all of which radiated into its surroundings. In the 
case of human atmospheres, feelings as humors could thus literally be smelled and 
prompted attraction or repulsion. Furthermore, since emanations varied accord-
ing to gender, occupation, diet, and habitat, atmospheres were social indicators, 
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suggestive of the character of a person, their social class, and emotional situation. 
Historian Alain Corbin (1986) thus speaks of these atmospheres as “social 
emanations.” Crucially, the atmospheres or feelings that bodies emanated were not 
mere immaterial aesthetic phenomena of perception but consisted of material 
effluvia and could even transmit contagion such as cholera. It is this non- binary 
concurrence of material substance and feelings already present in the early 
semantics of atmosphere that imbues the term with innovative potential and 
aligns it with affect in a monistic ontology (→ affect).
 With advances in scientific knowledge about the human body, the term 
“atmosphere” became largely obsolete as a medical term by the early 19th 
century. But connotations of “social effluvia” and the idea of materially 
emanating feelings remained an important semantic dimension of atmosphere 
in poetical and philosophical writings until the beginning of the 20th century. 
Thus, when Georg Simmel (1917), whose seminal footnotes on atmosphere 
have so far gone unnoticed in scholarship on the topic, spoke of the “atmo-
sphere” of both people and cities, he was not appropriating a meteorological 
term for the emergent discipline of sociology. Instead, his interest lay with 
the social implications of corporeal effluvia in processes of Vergesellschaftung 
(socialization). Like Simmel, psychiatrist Hubertus Tellenbach, writing much 
later in the 20th century, considered atmospheres in the quasi- medical sense 
of room- filling phenomena emanating from bodies. In his pioneering work 
Geschmack und Atmosphäre (Taste and Atmosphere) published in 1968 he 
extrapolated these personal emanations onto families, social groups, and 
nationalities where they would operate as media “of a prereflective and pre-
verbal elemental contact” (Tellenbach, 1981, p. 229). In Tellenbach’s psycho-
logical Daseins analyse, being social meant emanating and discerning atmosphere. 
With the discovery of pheromones, this decidedly materialist notion of atmo-
sphere as corporeal emanation came to resonate with new scientific evidence. 
Teresa Brennan (2004) thus concludes in her opus magnum that pheromonal 
odors are critical to how atmosphere is felt and affect is transmitted.
 Schmitz, who established “atmosphere” as a central concept of his 
phenomenology of the felt- body (Leibphänomenologie), bypasses the etymo-
logy of the word and considers atmosphere in its semantic confluence with 
the phenomenological notion of Stimmung (Wellbery, 2003). Schmitz was 
not the first to do so; William Stern (1935) who, like Schmitz, pursues a 
philosophical personalism, had already posited atmosphere as Stimmung. Stern 
argued that a feeling of familiarity, for instance, would be of “completely 
‘atmospheric’ nature; it is a total mood [Gesamtstimmung] in which the special 
affective tonings of people, things, and events are indistinguishably embed-
ded [my translation, F. R.]” (Stern, 1935, p. 784). Instead of drawing on 
Heidegger’s fundamental- ontological notion of Stimmung, however, Schmitz 
refers to psychological phenomenology and quotes Theodor Lipps’ (1906) 
“spatial feelings” (Raumgefühl) or Ludwig Binswanger’s (1933) “tuned 
spaces” (gestimmte Räume), famously defining feelings as spatially poured out 
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atmospheres (“ortlos ergossene Atmosphären”; cf. Schmitz, 1969/2005, p. 343). 
He conceives of atmospheres in terms of what he would, in contrast to 
Gernot Böhme’s (2017) spatiological thinking, later identify as a “situation 
ontology.” Atmospheres were thus holistically embedding situations per-
meated by and unfolding in suggestions of movement that modulate the 
dynamics of the felt- body (Schmitz, 1969/2005). Feelings, consequently, 
were not internal states of a subject but encountered in the world as quasi- 
objective external forces that grip the felt- body. In this anti- mentalist and 
anti- materialist stance, to feel, then, literally means to move and to be 
moved. In contrast to a Spinozist ontology however, Schmitz’s personalism 
is committed to a methodological anthropocentrism where a normative 
human person acts as the benchmark for an analysis of atmosphere: In order 
for his phenomenological accounts to gain general validity, the perceiver of 
atmosphere must be of normal human condition (Schmitz, 1969/2005, 
p. 131), of normal sanity (Schmitz, 1969/2005, p. XI) and normal mind 
(Schmitz, 1969/2005, p. 46). In light of this, Schmitz’s felt- body becomes 
highly suspicious and complicit in the very humanist project that theories of 
affect have intended to challenge.
 In the 1990s, Böhme translates Schmitz’s idiosyncratic language into a 
popular aesthetic theory that now focuses on the perception and creation of 
atmosphere. According to Böhme (2017) atmospheres pertain to “the 
common reality of the perceiver and the perceived” (p. 20) and are located 
between subject and object. Böhme (2017) conceives of the term as a meta-
phoric appropriation from meteorology and, unlike Schmitz, considers atmo-
spheres as emanating and radiating “ecstasies” of things, while apparently 
remaining unaware of the term’s historical and lexical associations with bodily 
effluvia. In contrast to the atmospheric emanations of the 18th and 19th centu-
ries, the radiations he speaks of turn out to be virtually immaterial since, as he 
repeatedly insists, they would be nothing without the perceiving subject 
(Böhme, 2017, p. 183). Böhme, whose writings are sometimes dismissed by 
his German peers as philosophically flawed (Wellbery, 2003), has nevertheless 
become a key reference in scholarship on atmosphere and applied research on 
ambiance. Critically expanding on Böhme, Jean- Paul Thibaud (2003), who 
develops a nuanced theory of urban ambiances, states that rather than being 
objects of perception, atmospheres condition perception. Rainer Kazig (2007) 
defines atmospheres as media between humans and environment, while Ben 
Anderson (2009) who, in a much- cited article, coins the phrase “affective 
atmosphere,” conceives of them as “singular affective qualities that emanate 
from but exceed the assembling of bodies” (p. 80). Mikkel Bille, Peter 
Bjerregaard, and Tim Flohr Sørensen (2015) who have critically pointed out 
the tautological character of the phrase “affective atmosphere,” suggest focus-
ing on the shaping and deliberate staging of atmospheres while Kathleen 
Stewart (2011) has identified them as “force fields” and Tonino Griffero 
(2014) has emphasized their “authority.”
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The grammar of atmosphere
In German, the word “Atmosphäre” is often used in conjunction with the verb 
“herrschen” (to rule, to reign, or to govern). Writing about lodging- houses in 
Manchester, Friedrich Engels (1892/1952) rhetorically contends: “What 
physical and moral atmosphere reigns in these holes, I need not state” (p. 42). 
The German collocation that Engels uses here, “an atmosphere reigns” (eine 
Atmosphäre herrscht), grammatically places both climatic and moral atmosphere 
in the subject position and imbues it with the agency to govern a sphere. 
Herein lies a critical structural difference between the semantic capacities of 
the German word “Atmosphäre” and the English word “atmosphere” since the 
latter finds it much harder to leave its grammatical status as an object. More-
over, the verb “to reign” underlines the mereological character of “atmo-
sphere”: just as the sovereign reigns over an area by uniting its inhabitants 
under one law, ideology, or banner, so an “atmosphere” is said to reign over 
a particular place and wield authority over all bodies present in that place (see 
also Griffero, 2014). The authority of atmosphere thus pertains to a location 
or situation as a whole, for instance, an apartment, a concert, a mass uprising, 
or a religious event. These places or events can all be described as being 
“governed” by a particular atmosphere. It thus comes as no surprise that cre-
ating and mobilizing atmospheres can be considered a technology of power.
 But this collocation is not exclusive to the lexeme “Atmosphäre.” Various 
words, from the phenomenal complex of weather and Stimmung to feelings 
such as grief, joy, boredom, or silence, are all collocated in German with the 
verb “herrschen” (to reign) and can consequently be assigned the grammatical 
subject position. This linguistic co- association of these diverse nouns further 
adds to their affinity, in particular between weather, feelings, and moral senti-
ments (→ sentiment). Syntactically speaking then, feelings and atmospheres in 
German are not necessarily descriptors of subjectivated human existence or 
qualities of situations and places, but dominant forces that “govern” situ-
ations, societies, spheres of action.
 Drawing on Morton’s theory of ambient poetics and on the “situation onto-
logy” in terms of which Schmitz frames his notion of atmosphere, I will elab-
orate upon the following four key characteristics of atmospheres: their 
mereological fabric, their modal structure, their intensification at affective 
thresholds, and their affective efficacy through “suggestions of movement.”
From meteorology to mereology
Key to the mereological conception of atmosphere proposed here is the 
seamless coherence of atmospheric phenomena. Morton (2007) argues that 
“ambient poetics is a rendering” (p. 35), a process whereby, for instance, all 
elements of a film are drenched in a technically generated color- scheme. 
Photo filter applications put this aspect of atmosphere to work and ultimately 
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commercialize the longing for atmospheric experiences. They do so by filter-
ing a photo into a finely- tuned coherent color- mode that retrospectively 
charges the image, and thus the memory of the situation in which it was 
taken, with an intensive atmosphere. Such rendering invokes coherence in 
two ways: First, processes of rendering pertain to a situation, a place or an 
artistic creation as a whole, and second, they also constitute its coherence; just as 
Johann G. Herder (1785/1869, p. 49) had posited that climate affected the 
entirety of things in a given region while at the same time rendering its 
inhabitants a cultural collective. In an atmosphere then, the multiplicity of 
bodies is imbued with a seamless hue, just as a sunset tinges the entire 
“world” in shades of red. The widely remarked affective “meaningfulness” of 
atmospheres (Vadén & Torvinen, 2015) is related to this coherence, for an 
atmospheric whole cannot be further differentiated into numerable elements 
or separate meanings.
 Critically, however, such a hue or climate that pervades a situation as 
atmosphere does not necessarily affect or involve each individual body in the 
same way. For this reason, Morton (2007) refers to the absorptive capacities 
of atmosphere as simulation. Atmospheres transform a situation of diverse ele-
ments in such a way that even discordant voices and bodies are fashioned in 
an all- encompassing style. Using the meteorological term “atmosphere” as a 
metaphor for the contagion of religion and religious mass mobilization, 
Friedrich Schleiermacher (1799/1958) argues that once religion has seized a 
critical mass, even those who are not converted by it shine in its light. In a 
crowd of believers, religiosity is simulated as strikingly genuine in the atmo-
sphere. Here, atmosphere does not simply invoke coherence but also simu-
lates it, erases inconsistencies, and melts, unifies, and homogenizes by 
imposing an overarching significance onto elements that might otherwise be 
unrelated. The 19th-century poet Edward Bulwer- Lytton (1842) names this 
the “deception” or “phantasmagoria” of atmosphere. Tim Flohr Sørensen 
(2015) exemplifies this aspect in his study on atmospheres of funeral rites in 
pre- historical passage graves, where he elaborates how the lack of light and 
thus visibility collapses the difference between living and dead bodies among 
whom one’s own presence is no longer confined to a bodily and bounded 
identity but becomes a “seamless infiltration” (p. 7). Not only is death atmos-
pheric in the penetrating darkness, but darkness undermines the (exceptional) 
status of the human subject as living being.
 As smoothing forces that evoke coherence, atmospheres are also highly polit-
ical, since they paint even conflicting voices in an all- encompassing homogen-
eous light. This can be exemplified by the musical “accompaniment” blaring 
from concentration camp loudspeakers, which served not only to drown out 
death cries acoustically, but to assimilate them into the musical mood of 
Wagnerian marches. Or consider the singing or chanting congregation in which 
participant individuals both simulate and consume religious unity (Riedel, 
2015). The monochrome uniforms in which the denizens of a totalitarian 
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regime or a religious community are attired are also such devices of unification. 
Similarly, the deliberate assimilation and mimetic strategies of dressing, moving, 
and shouting that prime a crowd for revolution (Runkel, 2018) or impel a foot-
ball team and their fans to prevail are technologies of mobilizing atmospheres of 
power (Edensor, 2014). Since atmosphere presides over situations in their 
entirety, it not only subverts anthropocentrism, but does away with the idea of 
a center altogether (see also Morton, 2002). Or, to use Schmitz’s terminology, 
atmosphere is spatial, but without a location and surface (“ortlos” and “randlos”). 
Atmosphere, then, does not simply surround a person as a centrifugal expanse, 
as some have argued, but, rather, following Morton, personhood itself may be 
conceived of as environmental or in fact atmospheric.
Modes and modulations
That music and sound but also light, odor, or weather all have a latent tend-
ency to become ubiquitous and thus to invoke coherence and charge a situ-
ation with atmosphere is due to their capacity to operate as modes. A 
landscape at night might be charged with atmosphere because the moonlight, 
or absence thereof, renders the entire world in a monochrome mode of 
shades of black, which may even obliterate the difference between earth and 
sky, void and matter, human and non- human. The atmosphere of the night 
here is not a locatable object in the world but a mode in which the hetero-
geneous objects coalesce in one characteristic color scheme. The same can be 
said for odors that have no defined location in space but rather modulate a 
space in its entirety, as in the historical notion of atmosphere- as-effluvia. 
Likewise, sound does not appear as an object in the world with a defined 
location and surface, but rather, charges an entire place or situation with 
sonorous intensity due to what Schmitz terms its surfacelessness.
 Appropriating the concept of mode from music theory, modes, like atmo-
spheres, are structured mereologically. A mode in the modern sense of scale, 
for instance, determines the pitch relationships in a musical piece. To shift 
only one pitch of the scale may transpose the entire musical piece into 
another mode. Mode thus determines the musical material in which music 
unfolds and thus always affects a musical piece in its entirety. It is for this 
reason that musical modes have a strong affinity to moods and to being 
atmospheric. In its extended sense as fashion, style, manner, or way (Weise), 
musical mode is not to be reduced to pitch relationships. Friedrich Schiller 
writes in 1797 that rhythm serves as a tool (Werkzeug) to provide a dramatic 
production with an “atmosphere,” because everything is subject to the law of 
rhythm. For Schiller, rhythm is a mode that combines “all characters and all 
situations [my translation, F. R.]” (von Goethe & Schiller, 1881, p. 329) of a 
play into one seamless whole.
 In modulating mood, atmosphere governs the relationships of its parts just 
as the scale sets the degrees of its pitches. In turn, the embeddedness of each 
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body within the encompassing whole predominates the more individual affec-
tive vectors in which bodies are related to each other. Even if we approach such 
atmospherically charged situations from the perspective of individual perception, 
those who are repelled by it or remain unaffected by it may nevertheless recog-
nize the way in which a situation coheres in a distributed feeling, or sense its 
grip as a modulating force (for modes of involvement and perception see 
Griffero, 2014). But it is also possible to turn this argument around and follow 
Robert Seyfert’s (2012) notion of the affectif, which he defines as “mode of 
affective interaction” where only bodies sharing a certain frequency spectrum 
are drawn into affective resonance (→ affective resonance). Thus, contrary to 
Schmitz’s normalized and ethnocentric configuration of the felt- body, a focus 
on the modes in which a situation coheres as atmosphere enables us to consider 
atmosphere with respect to the abundant cultural, historical, and physical diver-
sity of embodied end even disembodied existences.
Affective thresholds
Atmosphere, Leo Spitzer (1942) writes, indicates “something characteristic 
which distinguishes one place from another” (p. 22). This diacritic function 
of atmosphere is not accidental, but essential. Social movements and ritual 
situations play on contrast to mobilize atmospheres. Victor Turner (1995), 
who in the 1950s proposes to conceive of ritual (and society) as a process 
“with successive phases of structure and communitas [emphasis added]” (p. 78), 
highlights the atmosphere of communal singing precisely at the point in the 
process of a Ndembu pregnancy ritual where moral rules are explicitly 
inverted and where a highly sexualized language is given voice to in ritual 
songs that would otherwise be fraught with shame. In the ritual mode, shame 
is powerfully defused and replaced by a sexualized atmosphere that animates 
not an individual subject but transforms the entire situation into a “collective 
feeling” (Schmitz, 1969/2005) (→ affective communities). Climatic situations of 
transition from one meteorological state to another, such as the first day of 
spring or the notoriously photographed sunset that marks the dramatic thresh-
old between day and night, are also particularly atmospheric.
 Such affective thresholds are critical to musical modes that only make sense 
and produce meaning in their difference from each other. Put simply, mode is 
inherently differential. Furthermore, musical mode operates most powerfully as 
an atmospheric tool when one mode contrasts with another. The juxtaposition 
of modes is thus a musical technique of invoking atmosphere and affording 
experiences of immersion (→ immersion, immersive power), as, for instance, in the 
traditional court- music of Myanmar where musical pieces performed by the 
Hsaing Waing orchestra are structured in alternating tempos. The musical shift 
into quicker tempos powerfully generates a musical, and indeed corporeal, 
momentum that unleashes dancers from the preceding slow meter and pulls 
them into rapid movements. Music kicks in. The atmospheric tension here 
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derives not just from the substance of each of the rhythms but from their con-
trast. For this reason, the affective power of mode is always specific to histor-
ically situated musical traditions and cultures of listening, and their repertoires 
and modal systems. Similar techniques are employed in baroque suites or in 
classical symphonic works that are composed of a succession of distinctive 
movements that contrast in various musical parameters, such as a shift in key, 
meter and rhythm, volume, timbre, tempo, or orchestration.
Caught up in movement
The question that studies on atmosphere have usually started with is how an 
atmosphere is felt, perceived, or experienced. Attending to the material texture 
of light, temperature, sound, and architecture inside pre- historic passage- graves, 
Sørensen (2015) argues that bodily movements of entering and – in the case of 
the living – exiting the tomb, are not simply caused by architecture but are 
themselves generative of the spatial form and of a shifting sense of presence and 
self in “evolving kinesfields” (p. 7) and further alter sensorial perception. Move-
ment is thus integral to how atmospheres might have unfolded in situations of 
interment. Circumventing the clause of subjectivity characteristic of Böhme’s 
notion of atmosphere, a focus on movement in which bodies are continuous 
with architecture, sound, or climate, Sørensen suggests, enables a study of atmo-
sphere that decenters the human being.
 Schmitz, equally, elevates “movement” as a key term for his phenomeno-
logy of perception to evade what he sees as the problematic reduction of per-
ception to the senses. Rather than being seen, heard, or smelled, atmospheres 
are perceived in and through movement. “Being moved” is not a metaphor 
for feelings but a corporeal dynamic manifest in the felt- body. Even seem-
ingly static phenomena are related to the felt- body through what he terms 
“suggestions of movement” (Bewegungssuggestionen). Albeit immobile, archi-
tecture and landscape may nevertheless suggest movements through lines of 
flight, height, narrowness, darkness, or expansiveness. Climatic states, too, 
take effect as felt atmospheres by engulfing the felt- body in suggestions of 
movement, thus invoking feelings as atmospheres. Like architecture and 
weather, music assembles an entire array of suggested movements by means 
of harmonic tension, timbral shifts, rhythmic drive, melodic contour, or 
volume. In situations of worship and ritual music making, musical “sugges-
tions of movement” may function affectively in the manner of atmospheres as 
they may lead to spiritual transformations and religious becomings (Riedel, 
2015; see also Eisenlohr, 2018; Abels, 2018). Thus, in a worship service of a 
Pietist congregation, when the last verse of a protestant hymn is transposed 
into a higher key, a harmonic shift charged with movement suggestions takes 
place. The singing and seated congregation embodies this shift by standing up 
to sing the last verse, enraptured in a musical atmosphere saturated with reli-
gious feelings (Riedel, 2015).
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Conclusion
The ways in which atmospheres unfold and take effect are not limited to the 
four modalities outlined here. The diversity of culturally and historically spe-
cific situations in which atmospheres operate have yielded other key features 
such as vagueness, spatial extension, processual formation, or meaningfulness. 
The value of atmosphere as a heuristic concept, as I have sought to suggest 
here, however, is its mereological fabric that significantly exceeds the realm 
of (aesthetic) perception.
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